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1. Introduction 
For the past decades, network traffic has been showing immense growth trends, as we are 
witnessing the rapid development of network applications such as Internet Protocol TV 
(IPTV), peer-to-peer traffic, grid computing, multi-player gaming etc. Optical fiber, with its 
huge capacity of up to 50 THz, low bit error rate of 10-12, low loss of 0.2 dB/km and low 
noise and interference characteristics has been widely accepted as a viable future-proof 
solution to meet the ever-increasing network bandwidth demands. In comparison with the 
available fiber capacity, the speed of edge electronic equipment of only a few Gb/s creates a 
bottleneck, so fiber bandwidth is divided into independent wavelength sets, each capable of 
carrying traffic between a pair of nodes at different speeds. This is the underlying principle 
of Wavelength Division Multiplexing (WDM), where different wavelengths supporting 
communication between different end users are multiplexed and carried simultaneously 
over the same physical fiber. Under normal operating conditions, carried wavelengths do 
not significantly interfere with each other inside the fiber. At the receiver’s side, they are 
demultiplexed or filtered to ensure that every receiver receives the intended wavelength. An 
illustration of WDM principle is shown in figure 1. 
 
Fig. 1. Example of a simple WDM system. 
In Transparent Optical Networks (TONs), signals do not undergo optical-electronical-optical 
(OEO) conversion at the intermediate nodes they traverse. Communication takes place 
entirely in the optical domain, via all-optical channels called lightpaths. The process of 
establishing lightpaths consists of finding a physical route and assigning a wavelength to 
www.intechopen.com
 Optical Communications Systems 
 
124 
each of them, called Routing and Wavelength Assignment (RWA). The set of established 
lightpaths then comprises a so-called virtual topology over the given physical topology. 
Intermediate nodes perform wavelength-switching without regenerating or even 
interpreting the carried signals. Namely, full 3R (re-amplification, re-shaping, re-timing) 
signal regeneration in the optical domain is still in the experimental phase. Therefore, 
optical signals can only be re-amplified (1R) in the optical domain, while re-shaping and re-
timing require OEO conversion. We are currently witnessing the evolution of optical 
networking from opaque networks with all-electronic switching, implying OEO conversion 
at every node, to transparent networks with all-optical switching and no OEO conversions 
at intermediate nodes. Networks in which most of the nodes are transparent and some of 
them are strategically equipped with 2R and/or 3R regenerators to improve the quality of 
analog optical signals are called translucent (Shen & Tucker, 2007).  
The absence of lightpath regeneration in transparent optical networks not only provides 
signal transparency to bit rates, protocols and modulation formats but also reduces the costs 
and energy consumption associated with OEO conversion. However, transparency 
introduces significant changes to the security paradigm of optical networks by allowing 
signals whose characteristics fall out of the protocol-specific bounds or component working 
ranges to propagate through the network undetected. This creates a security vulnerability 
which can be exploited by a malevolent user to perform deliberate attacks aimed at 
degrading the proper functioning of the network. Due to the high data rates and latency 
employed in back-bone optical networks, even sporadic attacks of short duration can cause 
large data and revenue losses.  
Section 2 gives an overview of different types and methods of physical-layer attacks in 
TONs, along with experimental evaluation of some of the vulnerabilities of network 
components that can be exploited by malicious users. Section 3 gives an overview of the 
current issues and trends in attack management and control in TONs, as well as some 
methods and guidelines for increasing network resilience to attacks. Finally, Section 4 
concludes this chapter. 
2. TON vulnerabilities to physical-layer attacks 
The high data rates employed by TONs make them extremely sensitive to communication 
failures, whether they result from component malfunctions caused by external factors or 
fatigue, or from deliberate attacks. However, the differences between component faults and 
deliberate attacks make their consequences and recovery scenarios fundamentally different. 
Namely, disruption caused by component faults is restricted to the connections passing 
through the affected component, so rerouting these connections using classical survivability 
mechanisms usually solves the problem until the component is replaced/fixed. On the other 
hand, attacks can propagate to many users and different parts of the network, significantly 
complicating their detection and localization. Furthermore, the traffic itself can be the source 
of attack so rerouting affected connections may even worsen the consequences of the attack, 
instead of alleviating them. Furthermore, attacks, unlike failures, may appear sporadically 
so as to avoid detection.  
Overviews of various physical-layer attacks in TONs can be found in (Fok et al., 2011; Mas 
et al., 2005; Médard et al., 1997). An attacker can gain access to the physical network 
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components as a legitimate user (or impersonating one) or by otherwise breaching into the 
network. The attacker may be an outsider or, equally likely, a person with inside access to 
the network facilities, according to (Richardson, 2008).  
Depending on the intentions of the attacker, physical-layer attacks can be divided into two 
main groups: 
a. Tapping attacks - aimed at gaining unauthorized access to data and using it for traffic 
analyses or eavesdropping purposes.  
b. Service Disruption attacks - aimed at degrading the Quality of Service (QoS) or causing 
service denial. 
Tapping attacks imply breaches in communication privacy and confidentiality. Occurrences 
of these attacks have been recorded in the past, e.g. in 2000 when three main trunk lines of 
the Deutsche Telekom network were breached at Frankfurt Airport in Germany or when an 
illegal eavesdropping device was discovered attached to Verizon's optical network in 2003 
(Miller, 2007). The most likely purpose of these attacks was industrial espionage. Estimates 
indicate that only in the year 2000, corporate espionage cost US companies approximately 
$20 billion in purely technical means (Oyster Optics Inc., 2002). 
The goal of service disruption attacks is to deteriorate the signal quality of legitimate 
communication channels. Depending on the severity of these attacks, their consequences 
may range from slight deterioration of the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) to complete loss of 
service availability. They can also be aimed at manipulating communication by injecting 
false information or undermining the integrity of the transmitted data. Most commonly, 
these attacks are realized by injecting a malicious high-powered jamming signal which 
interferes with legitimate signals inside various network components. Methods of exploiting 
the vulnerabilities of the key building blocks of TONs (i.e. optical fibers, amplifiers and 
switches) to perform tapping and service disruption attacks are described in the following 
subsections. 
2.1 Optical fibers 
Optical fibers are immune to electromagnetic interference, which eliminates the possibility 
of eavesdropping through observation of side-channel effects, but, unless shielded, they are 
still susceptible to eavesdropping through other means. Namely, under normal operating 
conditions, light is kept inside the fiber core through total internal reflection, where the 
angle between the light beam and the core inner surface exceeds the critical angle and the 
beam is totally reflected back into the core. Bending the fiber violates the condition of total 
internal reflection of light inside the fiber core and causes part of the signal to be radiated 
out of the fiber, as shown in figure 2. If a photodetector is placed at the fiber bend, it can 
pick up such leakage and deliver the transmitted content to the intruder. Commercial 
tapping devices which introduce losses below 0.5 dB can be found on the market. There are 
also techniques which introduce losses below 0.1 dB, making such attacks extremely 
difficult to detect by network monitoring systems.  
Some of these devices may cause a short interruption of service due to the necessity of 
cutting the fiber in order to install the device, after which the transmission is re-established. 
If this interruption is noticed, the technical personnel is quite likely to find the location of 
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the tap, making this method short-lived (Witcher, 2005). However, some eavesdropping 
devices can be clamped onto the fiber and create micro bends causing leakage without 
actually cutting the fiber. Retrieval and interpretation of tapped data may require more 
sophisticated methods, depending on the signal wavelength, polarization, modulation 
format and other characteristics, but a well equipped attacker should be able to overcome 
these obstacles.  
  
Fig. 2. Bending the fiber violates the conditions of total internal reflection and causes light to 
leak outside the fiber core. 
Bending the fiber also enables a jamming signal to be inserted into the network. Under 
normal operating conditions, transmission effects in fibers are fairly linear, but high 
distances or high input powers increase the nonlinear effects among signals, of which four-
wave mixing and cross-phase modulation are the most significant. A powerful jamming 
signal injected into the fiber enhances these effects and deteriorates the SNR of other signals. 
Due to the low attenuation of optical fibers, such a jamming signal can propagate from the 
entry point to other network components without losing its power and cause damage inside 
optical amplifiers and switches. This may be especially significant in new optical fiber access 
networks, where splitters and fibers are largely placed in public areas, with easy access to 
anyone. 
2.2 Optical amplifiers 
Erbium-doped fiber amplifiers (EDFAs) are the most commonly used optical amplifiers 
in today’s WDM networks. They use an erbium-doped optical fiber core as gain medium 
to amplify optical signals. The energy of ionized erbium atoms can change between 
discrete levels. Atoms in lower energy levels have less energy and they can be raised to a 
higher level by absorbing an amount of energy equal to the difference between the two 
levels. Equivalently, a transition from a higher to a lower energy level results in the 
emission of a photon whose energy equals the difference between the two levels.  In a 
normal state, the amount of erbium ions in the ground energy level is much higher than 
those in upper levels. To achieve amplification, the gain medium is pumped with an 
external source of energy which causes the number of ions in higher energy levels to 
exceed their number in lower levels, i.e. obtaining population inversion. When light of 
the appropriate frequency passes through such a medium, its photons stimulate the 
transition of excited electrons to lower energy levels, resulting in the stimulated emission 
of photons which have the same frequency, direction of propagation, phase and 
polarization as the incident photons. In this way, the incoming optical signal is 
amplified. 
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Fig. 3. Three energy levels of Er3+ ions in silica glass for 980 nm pumping. Each discreet 
energy level represents a continuous energy band. 
Figure 3 shows three energy levels – E1, E2 and E3 of Er3+ ions in silica glass. In reality, the 
energy levels shown here as discreet are spread into a continuous energy band. The energy 
difference between levels E1 and E3 corresponds to the energy of photons of light at 980 nm. 
When light at that wavelength is pumped into the erbium-doped fiber, its absorption causes 
the transition of ions from E1 to E3. Light at 1480 nm can also be used for pumping, but the 
pumping process is more efficient at 980 nm, resulting in a higher gain for the same pump 
power (Ramaswami & Sivarajan, 2002). The excited ions stay at the E3 level for a very short 
time and then quickly transit to level E2. The lifetime of the transition from level E2 to E1 is 
much longer, about 10 ms, and it is accompanied by the emission of photons on a 
wavelength between 1525 and 1570 nm. With pumping power high enough, the ions which 
fall back to level E1 are quickly raised to E3. The result of the synergy of these two processes 
is that most of the ions can be found at level E2, i.e. population inversion between levels E2 
and E1 is achieved. Under such conditions, light on wavelengths of 1525-1570 nm is 
amplified by stimulated emission from level E2 to level E1. 
An optical amplifier is characterized by its gain, gain bandwidth, gain saturation, 
polarization sensitivity and amplifier noise (Mukherjee, 2006). The gain is defined as the 
ratio between the power of the signal at the output of the amplifier and its power at the 
input. Gain bandwidth specifies the frequency range over which the amplifier is effective. 
This parameter limits the number of wavelengths available in a network for a given channel 
spacing. Gain saturation is the value of output power after which an increase in input power 
no longer causes an increase in output power. It is usually defined as the output power at 
which there is a 3 dB reduction in the amplifier gain. Polarization sensitivity measures the 
difference in gain between two orthogonal polarizations of the dominant signal mode (HE11 
mode). The prevailing component of amplifier noise for EDFAs is Amplifier Spontaneous 
Emission (ASE), which arises from spontaneous transitions of ions from energy level E2 to 
E1, independent of any external radiation. Although the radiated photons have the same 
energy as the incoming optical signal, their frequency, phase, polarization and direction do 
not match. 
EDFAs have several advantages over other types of optical amplifiers, such as Raman and 
semiconductor optical amplifiers. They provide high gain, are capable of simultaneous 
amplification of WDM signals independent of the light polarization state, have a low noise 
figure and low sensitivity to temperature (Laude, 2002). However, they also have drawbacks 
such as additional noise (ASE), dependency of gain on the spectrum and power of the 
incoming signal, and transients which occur when individual WDM channels are dropped. 
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If we consider each of the discrete energy levels in the doped fiber as a continuous energy 
band, then EDFAs are capable of simultaneously amplifying signals on several different 
wavelengths. As mentioned before, they most commonly amplify signals within the 1525-
1570 nm wavelength range. However, due to the fact that the distribution of excited 
electrons is not uniform at various levels within a band, the gain of an EDFA depends on 
the wavelength of the incoming signal, with a peak around 1532 nm (Ramaswami & 
Sivarajan, 2002). This can be compensated for by employing passive or dynamic gain 
equalization (Bae et al., 2007; Laude, 2002). However, the limited number of available 
upper-state photons necessary for signal amplification must be divided among all 
incoming signals. Each of the signals is granted photons proportional to its power level, 
which can lead to so-called gain competition, where stronger incoming signals receive more 
gain, while weaker signals receive less. Due to the large number of input channels and 
high data rates employed in today’s WDM networks, the dependency of EDFA gain 
assignment on the spectrum and power of the incoming signals can have a significant 
impact on network functioning.  
Gain competition can be exploited to create service disruption as described in (Mas et al., 
2005; Médard et al., 1998). In an out-of-band jamming attack, a malicious user injects a 
powerful signal (e.g. 20 dB above normal) on a wavelength different from those of other, 
legitimate signals, but still within the pass-band of the amplifier. The amplifier, unable to 
distinguish between the attacking signal and legitimate data signals, provides gain to each 
signal indiscriminately. The stronger, malicious signal will get more gain than the weaker, 
legitimate signals, robbing them of power. Thereby, the QoS level on the legitimate 
signals will deteriorate, potentially leading to service denial. Furthermore, the power of 
the attacking signal will have an additional increase downstream of the amplifier, 
allowing it to spread through other transparent nodes and affect other signals at their 
common EDFAs. 
2.2.1 Laboratory assessment of gain competition 
The impact of the jamming signal depends on its power level and wavelength. We tested 
this relation in laboratory setting (Furdek et al., 2010a) using two EXFO IQ-2600 tunable 
lasers sources, variable attenuators EXFO IQ-3100 to attenuate the signals and simulate 
losses in the optical fiber and an EDFA with 36 m of erbium-doped fiber Lucent 
Technologies HE-980 as the gain medium, pumped with a 980 nm pump signal from an 
Agilent FPL4812/C laser pump. One of the laser sources represented a legitimate signal 
with constant power (-25,51 dBm before entering the EDFA) and wavelength (1549,74 
nm), while the other represented a powerful jamming signal with varying power and 
wavelength. Figure 4 shows the dependence of the amount of gain given to the 
legitimate signal on the power of the jamming signal on the next WDM channel, at 
1549,05 nm. The power of the interfering signal was increased in 2 dB increments from 
the same level as the legitimate signal, until it was 20 dB stronger. The pump power was 
set to 40 mW. The measurements in figure 4 show how the amount of gain of the 
legitimate signal decreases in response to an increase in the power of the interfering 
signal. This is due to the fact that the interfering signal, as it becomes more powerful, 
consumes more and more upper-state photons in the EDFA, and thus robs the legitimate 
signal of gain. 
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Fig. 4. The power of the legitimate signal at the output of the EDFA as a function of the power 
superiority of the interfering signal on the neighboring WDM channel, at 40 mW EDFA 
pumping power. 
The gain of the legitimate signal also depends on variations in the wavelength of the 
interfering signal of constant, high power. Figure 5 shows this dependency for the legitimate 
signal at 1549,74 nm and a 20 dB stronger interfering signal whose nominal wavelength 
varies from 1530 nm to 1550 nm, in 5 nm increments. The influence of different operating 
points of the EDFA on the output power of the legitimate signal in this scenario was 
investigated by changing the pump power from 40 mW to 80 mW. In figure 5, P_legit 
denotes the power of the legitimate signal, and P_interfering the power of the interfering 
signal at the EDFA output. Power levels measured for pump powers of 40 mW and 80 mW 
have suffixes _40mWpump and _80mWpump, respectively. From figure 5, it can be seen that 
the amount of gain robbed from the legitimate signal by the high-powered jamming signal 
increases as their wavelength separation decreases. 
Table 1 summarizes the influence of wavelength separation and power superiority of the 
interfering signal over the legitimate signal at 1549,74 nm. In the first case, the wavelength 
of the interfering signal matches the used EDFA gain peak at 1531 nm. In the second case, it 
is at the first neighboring WDM channel, i.e. at 1549,08 nm.  For both cases, we investigate 
the gain of the legitimate signal for jamming signal power levels 10 dB and 20 dB higher 
than the legitimate signal. For two pump powers, i.e. 40 mW and 80 mW, the first row in the 
table shows the gain of the legitimate signal when no jamming signal is present. The values 
in the table clearly show that the presence of a strong signal results in weaker amplification 
of the signal at lower power level. The gain of the legitimate signal drops as the power of the 
interfering signal increases. Furthermore, for a given power level of the interfering signal, its 
harmful effect to the legitimate signal is more intense when their wavelengths are close in 
the spectrum, as highlighted in the table.  
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Fig. 5. The power of the legitimate and interfering signal at the output of the EDFA as a 
function of the wavelength of the interfering signal, at 40 mW and 80 mW EDFA pumping 
power and the interfering signal 20 dB stronger than the legitimate. 
Out-of-band jamming can also be used to tap a signal. In some optical amplifiers, gain 
competition occurs at the modulation rate, which enables tapping by observing cross-
modulation effects. 
 
EDFA pump 
power [mW] 
Power superiority of the 
interfering signal [dB] 
Wavelength of the 
interfering signal [nm] 
Gain of the legitimate 
signal [dB] 
40 
- - 20,34 
10 
1530,84 17,51 
1549,08 15,38 
20 
1530,84 12,62 
1549,08 8,01 
80 
- - 22,68 
10 
1530,84 20,61 
1549,08 20,03 
20 
1530,84 15,63 
1549,08 11,59 
Table 1. An overview of the gain of the legitimate signal at 1549,74 nm for different test 
scenarios, with the power of the interfering signal at 10 and 20 dB above that of legitimate 
signal. 
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2.2.2 Amplifier cascades 
When EDFAs are used in a cascade, the flatness of their gain becomes a critical issue. 
Namely, slight differences between the amounts of gain available for signals at different 
wavelengths get multiplied as they traverse the cascaded amplifiers. Because of this, signals 
on certain wavelengths might get amplified several times, while others may suffer from 
significant SNR deterioration (Ramaswami & Sivarajan, 2002). This situation is shown in 
figure 6. There are several ways of dealing with this issue. For example, signals on different 
wavelengths can be pre-equalized, so that the signals on wavelengths with higher gain are 
attenuated, and those with lower gain are amplified before entering the cascaded amplifier 
segment. Another way of dealing with the problem is to introduce gain equalization at each 
amplifier stage.  
 
Fig. 6. The cumulative effect of unequal amplifier gain at different wavelengths after a 
cascade of amplifiers. 
In case of cascaded EDFAs, power transients potentially present a great security threat. Due 
to the fact that the amplifier gain depends on the total input power, the failure of one 
channel will lead to surviving channels getting more gain and, thus, have higher power 
when they arrive to their receivers. This means that setting up or tearing a channel down 
affects other channels that share amplifiers with it (Karásek & Vallés, 1998). This effect may 
cause serious problems in dynamic optical networks where suppression of transients 
becomes increasingly important. A typical amplifier implementation used in today’s 
networks consists of two EDFA stages working in gain mode, where setting up a new 
channel will not affect power levels of existing channels (Zsigmond, 2011). Automatic gain 
control (AGC) solves the problem of transients by monitoring the power levels in different 
ways and keeping the output power per channel constant, regardless of the input power. In 
such a network, high-power signals could not propagate. However, this is only valid for 
deviations of power within a certain window defined by the component specifications. If the 
difference between the power of the jamming signal and the normal users’ signals exceeds 
this range, amplifiers with AGC may not be able to provide power equalization. (Way et al., 
1993) proposed optical limiting amplifiers able to limit the output power of all signals 
within a dynamic range of input power and thwart the propagation of jamming attacks, but 
at a trade-off with a higher price of such equipment. Today, most commercially available 
amplifiers are capable of monitoring channel power and reducing the excessive power levels 
of jamming signals (Zsigmond, 2011). However, (Deng & Subramaniam, 2004) describe an 
attack which can affect even networks with ability to equalize excessive power levels. It is 
referred to as a low power QoS attack. Amplifier placement along the link usually ensures 
compensation for the preceding fiber span. If an attacker attacks a splitter at the beginning 
of a link, they are able to attenuate the power of the signal more than the amplifier is able to 
compensate for. Such induced attenuation can significantly degrade the performance 
metrics of attacked lightpaths. The attenuation at the end of the link on which the splitter is 
installed may not be significant enough to generate an alarm at that exact location, but it 
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may cause other network elements with power equalization capabilities (e.g., switches) to 
reduce the power of other signals in an effort to maintain an even distribution of power 
among channels. Hence, other lightpaths suffer from attenuation and may cause the same 
effect in other parts of the network. When service degradation along a lightpath finally 
crosses the preset threshold, the location of the raised alarm may be far from the original 
placement of the attached splitter. This type of an attack may be especially significant for 
networks employing Raman amplifiers, whose usage is increasing in long haul transmission 
suffering from high attenuation (Zsigmond, 2011). Security advantages of Raman amplifiers 
include more reliable amplification, higher saturation power than EDFA and more accurate 
monitoring, resulting in faster generation of alarms in case of signal anomalies (Islam, 2003). 
However, output powers of Raman amplifiers are high and require splicing. Multiple 
splices can cause the Raman pumps to be reflected and, thus, highly reduce the amplifier 
gain. This vulnerability can be a target of a planned attack, possibly leading to a link outage 
(Zsigmond, 2011). Furthermore, Raman amplifiers require high-power pump sources at the 
right wavelength and an attacker with inside access to an amplifier may endanger the 
amplification process by tampering with any of these parameters. 
2.3 Optical switches 
The main functions of wavelength-selective optical cross-connects (OXC), also referred to as 
reconfigurable wavelength routing switches, can include lightpath provisioning, 
wavelength switching, protection switching (rerouting connections), wavelength conversion 
and performance monitoring. Such optical switches usually consist of demultiplexers, 
photonic switching fabric and multiplexers. A typical architecture of a wavelength-selective 
OXC is shown in figure 7. 
 
Fig. 7. The typical architecture of a wavelength-selective OXC, consisting of multiplexers, 
demultiplexers and wavelength switching fabric (WSF). 
The incoming signal is first decomposed by demultiplexers into constituent wavelengths, 
which are then directed each onto their own switching fabric. Multiplexing and 
demultiplexing can be realized using Arrayed Waveguide Gratings (AWGs), Thin-Film 
Filters (TFF), Mach-Zehnder Interferometers (MZIs), Fiber Bragg Gratings (FBG) and other. 
The Wavelength Switching Fabric (WSF), i.e., the central part of the node, performs 
transparent switching of WDM channels from their input to output ports. Optical switches 
can be implemented using 2D or 3D Micro-Electro-Mechanical Systems (MEMS), 
semiconductor optical amplifier (SOA) gates, holographic switches, liquid crystal, and 
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thermo-optical or electro-optical technologies (Tzanakaki et al., 2004). The WSF can be 
reconfigurable or fixed. A fixed or non-reconfigurable switching fabric has manually hard-
wired connections between input and output ports, which cannot be changed on demand. 
On the other hand, connections between input and output ports of reconfigurable WSFs can 
be dynamically reconfigured in times ranging from several milliseconds (MEMS, bubble, 
liquid crystal, opto-mechanical, thermo-optic switch), several microseconds (acousto-optic 
switch) to several nanoseconds (electro-optic, SOA-based switch) (Papadimitriou et al., 2003; 
Rohit et al., 2011). After switching is performed, wavelengths intended to each output fiber 
are combined by multiplexers.  
The main security vulnerability of optical switches arises from their proneness to signal 
leaking, giving rise to crosstalk. Almost all TON components, i.e., filters, multiplexers, 
demultiplexers and switches, introduce crosstalk in one form or another. Malicious users 
can take advantage of this phenomenon to cause service degradation and/or perform 
eavesdropping. 
 
Fig. 8. (a) An optical multiplexer/demultiplexer and (b) an optical switch as sources of 
interchannel and intrachannel crosstalk. 
In general, there are two types of crosstalk in transparent optical networks – interchannel 
and intrachannel crosstalk. Interchannel crosstalk occurs between signals on sufficiently 
spaced wavelengths, i.e. such that they do not fall inside each other’s receiver pass-bands. 
Adjacent channels are usually the primary sources of crosstalk, while the influence of 
channels with higher wavelength separation is usually negligible. Inside OXCs, this type of 
crosstalk arises from non-ideal demultiplexing, where one channel is selected while the 
others are not perfectly dropped. This scenario is shown in figure 8(a). Depending on the 
implementation of the (de)multiplexers, their levels of crosstalk may range from 12 dB for 
TFF to 30 dB for AWG, MZI and FBG (Mukherjee, 2002). Intrachannel crosstalk occurs 
among signals on the same wavelength, or signals whose wavelengths fall within each 
other’s receiver pass-band.  
Multiplexers, demultiplexers and optical switches can all be sources of intrachannel 
crosstalk. Namely, when demultiplexers separate incoming signals at different wavelengths, 
a small portion of each signal leaks onto ports reserved for signals at other wavelengths. 
After switching, when multiple signals at different wavelengths are multiplexed back onto 
the same output fiber, small portions of a certain wavelength that had leaked onto other 
wavelengths can leak back onto the common fiber (Rejeb et al., 2006b). Consequently, the 
signal on that wavelength will have crosstalk originating from its very own components 
carrying the same information, but suffering from different delays and phase shifts, as 
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shown in figure 8(a). Intrachannel crosstalk can also arise in optical switches due to non-
ideal switching. Namely, switching ports are not perfectly isolated from each other, so 
components of different signals transmitted on the same wavelength can leak and interfere 
with each other. Since the damaging signal is on the same wavelength as the legitimate 
signal, intrachannel crosstalk cannot be filtered out by optical filters or removed by 
demultiplexers (Deng et al., 2004). Figure 8(b) shows an optical switch as a source of 
intrachannel crosstalk. Crosstalk levels of optical switches range from 35 dB (SOA, liquid 
crystal, electro-optical, thermo-optical and holographic switches) to 55 dB for MEMS. 
Optical couplers are the basic building blocks of optical switches, multiplexers and 
demultiplexers, modulators, filters and wavelength converters (Ramaswami & Sivarajan, 
2002) and are the source of a significant amount of inter/intra-channel crosstalk. Generally, 
an optical coupler is a device used to combine or split signals in an optical network and can 
be passive or active. In passive couplers, employed in TONs, signals are redistributed 
without opto-electrical conversion and do not require any external power. 
 
Fig. 9. A (a) directional coupler and its two states: (b) cross state and (c) bar state. 
A passive directional 2×2 coupler is shown in figure 9(a). It consists of a pair of parallel 
optical waveguides in close proximity. The most commonly used couplers, called fused fiber 
couplers, are made by fusing two fibers together in the middle (Ramaswami & Sivarajan, 
2002). The fraction of the signal power that is transferred from the input to the output of an 
optical waveguide is defined by the coupling ratio α, denoting that a fraction α of the power 
of the signal at the input of a waveguide is transferred to its output, while the remaining 1-α 
of the power is directed to the output of the other waveguide. Ideally, all the input power on 
one waveguide of a directional coupler is coupled to the other waveguide for the cross state, 
while in the bar state there should be no coupling between the two waveguides.  
Figures 9(b) and (c) show the cross state and the bar state of an optical coupler, respectively. 
In reality, however, light is not perfectly coupled and components of signals from different 
waveguides leak onto unintended outputs, giving rise to crosstalk. Non-ideal signal 
coupling also causes signal losses and attenuation, which can be compensated by placing 
optical amplifiers at the splice output. In this way, however, the desired part of the signal 
will be amplified as well as the undesired part, which makes crosstalk the main deficiency 
of optical couplers (Vaez & Lea, 2000). Crosstalk in a directional coupler is defined as the 
ratio of light power at the undesired output port to the power at the desired output port 
with crosstalk levels varying between -20 dB and -30 dB. It can occur for various reasons, 
including waveguide asymmetry, absorption loss, non-optimal coupling length, unequal 
excitation of the symmetric and asymmetric modes at the input, or fabrication variations 
(Chinni et al., 1995).  
Couplers can be wavelength selective, and they are often used to combine signals at 1310 
nm and 1550 nm onto a single fiber, or to split them from the same incoming fiber to two 
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different outputs. In the latter case, due to crosstalk, small portions of the signal passing 
through the coupler are directed onto unintended outputs, deteriorating the Signal to Noise 
Ratio (SNR) of the signal which was intended for that output. Levels of this crosstalk 
depend on the exact wavelengths of the incoming signals. 
2.3.1 Laboratory assessment of crosstalk in optical couplers 
We tested the crosstalk of couplers in a laboratory setting from (Furdek et al., 2010b), using a 
FIS WDM13500129U coupler/splitter with SMF28 Singlemode fiber, operating at wavelengths 
1310/1550 nm +/- 20 nm. This coupler was used as a wavelength-selective splitter for dividing 
the incoming WDM signal from the input port into its constituent wavelengths to two different 
output ports, i.e. one for signals at 1310 nm, and the other one for 1550 nm.  
 
Fig. 10. Power at the coupler outputs dedicated to wavelengths at 1310 and 1550 nm for 
different wavelength of the incoming signal. 
Figure 10 shows the effects of imperfect splitting of the incoming signal to ports dedicated to 
wavelengths at 1310 and 1550 nm, i.e. the power of the incoming signal at various 
wavelengths near 1550 nm present at the 1310 nm output. As the wavelength of the 
incoming signal decreases from 1560,32 nm to 1529,90 nm (in 5 nm steps), and approaches 
the central frequency of the 1310 nm output, the undesirable leakage intensifies. 
 
Fig. 11. The spectrum of the incoming signal at 1550 nm on the output port corresponding to 
1550 nm (upper line) and on the output port corresponding to 1310 nm (lower line). 
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Figure 11 shows this effect for incoming signal at a nominal wavelength of 1550 nm. The 
upper line shows the spectrum of the signal at the output port corresponding to 
wavelengths around 1550 nm, while the lower line shows the spectrum at the output port 
corresponding to wavelengths around 1310 nm. The peak of the signal recorded at the 1310 
nm-output clearly indicates the amount of the signal at 1550 nm that had leaked onto the 
unintended output. The signal power level of 1,48 dBm at the 1550 nm port, combined with 
-20,50 dBm at the 1310 nm port, indicates that the level of crosstalk is -21,98 dB. This value 
by itself is not large enough to significantly impact signal quality. However, many network 
components consist of several cascaded optical couplers, which all contribute to the overall 
level of crosstalk. Furthermore, signals traverse numerous components on their path from 
source to destination. When these factors combine, enough crosstalk can accumulate over 
the propagation path of a signal for the risk of service degradation to increase significantly 
even in cases when there is no high-powered jamming signal. When such a signal is present 
in the network, it causes an additional increase in the leakage inside couplers and 
components they comprise, resulting in a significant damage to co-propagating user signals. 
2.3.2 Crosstalk attacks 
Although crosstalk originating from direct couplers can have a significant impact on the 
overall Quality of Service (QoS) in the network, problems caused by crosstalk in optical 
networks can go beyond such signal quality deterioration. Namely, a malevolent user can 
take advantage of crosstalk to perform attacks aimed at eavesdropping, tapping, and/or 
degrading the quality of service (QoS) of other users. An overview of methods using 
crosstalk for attack purposes can be found in (Mas et al., 2005).  
 
Fig. 12. An example of a tapping attack exploiting intra-channel crosstalk in a wavelength-
selective switch. 
Figure 12 shows an example of a tapping attack exploiting intrachannel crosstalk in a 
wavelength-selective switch, as described in (Médard et al., 1997). The upper input port is not 
used, while the bottom port receives incoming signals on wavelengths λ1 and λ2. Each of the 
signals on those two wavelengths is switched on its own switching fabric. Due to mechanisms 
of intrachannel crosstalk in demultiplexers, multiplexers and switching fabric described in the 
previous sections, components of both signals leak onto unintended outputs and get amplified 
by the power amplifier (EDFA). If a tapper gains access to one of the unused output ports, e.g. 
the upper output port in figure 12, part of the signal at λ2 is delivered straight into his hands. 
This problem can be solved by individually amplifying only signals on connections which are 
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registered at the network management system. However, an attacker can still request a 
legitimate data channel and then not send any information over it, but use it to tap other 
signals at the same wavelength. In figure 12, the tapper is User 1, whose false data connection 
at wavelength λ2 picks up components of User 2’s legitimate connection at the same 
wavelength that had leaked inside their common switch. 
Intrachannel crosstalk enables in-band jamming, an attack method in which an attacker inserts a 
powerful signal within the signal window of the legitimate user he is trying to affect. 
Consequently, two signals may undesirably exchange information at their common switch.  
 
Fig. 13. An example of a jamming attack exploiting intra-channel crosstalk in an optical 
switch. 
Figure 13 shows an example of a jamming attack via intrachannel crosstalk in optical 
switches. Here, an attacker injects a high-powered signal on the same wavelength as other, 
legitimate data signals. Components of the high-powered signal will leak onto adjacent 
channels inside their common optical switches, impairing the quality of the transmission on 
those signals. If the attacking signal is strong enough, it is possible that enough power is 
transferred onto adjacent channels inside their common switch, for them to gain attacking 
capabilities. Consequently, the attacked signal becomes an attacker itself, allowing the attack 
to propagate through the network, affecting signals which do not even share any physical 
components with the original attacking signal. This type of attack is shown in figure 14. Via 
intra-channel crosstalk in switches, the attacker managed to affect not only user 1’s 
legitimate signal, but the attack also propagated to users 2 and 3, which share no common 
physical components with the original attacker. This type of attack is particularly hazardous 
to network operation since the nature of its propagation makes localization of the original 
source of attack very difficult.  
Jamming attack exploiting intrachannel crosstalk in switches has been previously identified 
in the literature by (Wu & Somani, 2005), and recently (Peng et al., 2011) provided an 
experimental validation of the proposed attack model. They proved through simulation that 
high-power jamming attacks indeed possess propagation capabilities in affecting other 
lightpaths at the same wavelength via intrachannel crosstalk inside their common switches 
and lightpaths at different wavelengths via interchannel crosstalk inside their common 
fibers. The propagation of intrachannel crosstalk attacks ends after at most three stages of 
optical switches, while interchannel crosstalk attacks get attenuated after traversing three 
fiber segments. This means that, in the scenario from figure 14, the signal quality of user 3 
would not suffer from serious BER degradation from the attacker’s jamming signal.  
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Fig. 14. Propagation of intra-channel crosstalk attacks in an all-optical network. 
The vulnerability of TONs to high-power jamming attacks depends on employed hardware 
components and node architectures, as well as the architecture of the established virtual 
topology. Besides the wavelength-selective (WS) realization of OXCs, they can also be 
implemented as broadcast-and-select (B&S) devices. In B&S architecture, the wavelength 
switching fabric is replaced by passive splitters and couplers which connect the incoming 
signal to tunable filters. After filtering the desired wavelength, the signals from filter 
outputs are coupled onto the desired OXC output port. (Arbués et al., 2007) report that B&S 
architectures exhibit greater vulnerability to in-band jamming due to low isolation of 
tunable filters. WS architecture performs slightly better due to improved isolation at the 
multiplexing and demultiplexing stages.  
(Liu & Ji, 2007) studied the impact of the physical topology in conjunction with its 
constituent devices and the network traffic on the network resilience to in-band jamming 
attacks. Under the assumption of a fully connected virtual topology, i.e. a connection 
between each node pair and assuming that jamming attack propagation is not possible, they 
find that fully-connected mesh, star and ring physical topologies are the least resilient to 
attacks. The main cause of low resilience of a fully-connected mesh is its high nodal degree 
and, hence, a high expected number of affected channels at each node. The latter is also the 
reason why star networks are highly susceptible to attacks. For ring topologies, their 
vulnerability stems from large route lengths. A chord network topology is distinguished as 
the most resilient to attacks, with a logarithmic increase in resilience loss for a linear growth 
of the network size. 
3. Security in TONs 
As previously mentioned, the high data rates and huge throughput associated with 
transparent optical networks make them extremely sensitive to communication failures caused 
by component faults or deliberate attacks. A secure network should provide physical security 
of communication, i.e. provide service availability, guarantee a certain level of QoS and protect 
data integrity and privacy of communication. It should also ensure semantic security, i.e. 
protect the confidentiality and the meaning of data through authentication and cryptography 
mechanisms. Transparent optical transmission and the properties of attacks as described in the 
previous section impose a new set of demands on the network management system (NMS), 
responsible for network configuration, performance engineering, fault handling and the secure 
and safe functioning of the network (Rejeb et al,. 2010; Li et al., 2002).  
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The headstone of an efficient NMS in TONs is a flexible and robust control plane, which 
relies on accurate and timely monitoring in the optical domain. Control plane functions can 
roughly be divided into following tasks (Rejeb et al., 2010; Saha et al., 2003): 
 Resource management – accurate information on resource availability must be available 
at all times and updated upon lightpath establishment or tear-down. 
 Lightpath provisioning – initially, the topology and resources must be automatically 
discovered. For each incoming lightpath demand, the control plane should calculate a 
physical route based on the available resources and tentative QoS requirements. For 
this, accurate information regarding resource availability and the associated service 
quality is crucial.  
 Signaling – information exchange regarding connection establishment, maintenance 
and tear-down between nodes, as well as the management of alarms in cases of failures, 
must be present. 
Optical network security requires protective and/or preventive measures which minimize 
network accessibility to attackers, limit attack propagation and reduce the damage 
proportions inflicted by attacks. However, when an attack occurs in spite of these 
mechanisms, the NMS needs to undertake the following steps: 
 Detect the attack – discover a deterioration of signal quality, an intrusion in the fiber, a 
loss of service or any other direct consequence of an attack. After detecting the presence 
of an attack, its exact location must be determined and the source of the attack must be 
identified. 
 React to the attack – by triggering reaction mechanisms, the attacker’s access point must 
be isolated and the harmful effects must be neutralized. The affected connections must 
be restored and communication should resume as fast as possible.   
3.1 Protection and prevention of attacks  
The risks and damage associated with physical-layer attacks can be alleviated through 
careful network planning, employment of additional equipment, quick and accurate post-
attack recovery and optical cryptography. Achieving complete protection requires large 
investments by the network operator and may be economically unviable. Thus, an 
advantageous trade-off between the costs and achieved protection must be found. Attack 
protection may include the following measures (Fok et al., 2011; Médard et al., 1997): 
 Hardware measures – shielding the fiber to protect from tapping, introducing additional 
equipment in the network capable of limiting excessive power (e.g. optical limiting 
amplifiers or variable optical attenuators), or using optical fuses which melt under high 
power (Shuto et al., 2004) to protect from high-power jamming. Using components with 
lower crosstalk levels also helps reduce the risk from jamming and tapping attacks. 
 Transmission schemes – applying different modulation and coding techniques or limiting 
the bandwidth and power of certain signals may help against tapping and jamming.  
 Architecture and protocol design – identifying and avoiding risky links or assigning 
different routes and wavelengths to separate trusted from untrusted users may 
decrease the risk. Here, assessment of link risk and user trustworthiness is crucial, 
which may be extremely complicated.  
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 Optical encryption – protects communication confidentiality by making it 
incomprehensible to an eavesdropper. 
 Optical steganography – protects communication privacy by hiding the transmission 
between a pair of users underneath the public transmission channel. In this way, an 
attacker is unaware of the existence of communication, which makes it extremely 
difficult to perform tapping or jamming. However, the overall network vulnerability to 
jamming attacks may result in hidden communication being a collateral victim of 
jamming public channels. 
 Optical network survivability – intelligent protection schemes can increase resilience to 
attacks by switching the signals under attack to unaffected parts of the spectrum or to 
physically disjoint backup paths. 
Prevention may play a significant role in enhancing TON resilience to attacks, as well as the 
reduction of the deteriorating effects of attacks. The concept of attack-aware optical 
networks planning to reduce attack consequences was introduced in (Skorin-Kapov et al., 
2010). By determining the mutual jamming attack relations between lightpaths, a novel 
objective criterion for the routing and wavelength assignment problem was defined, called 
the Lightpath Attack Radius (LAR).  By minimizing the LAR of each lightpath through 
judicious routing, the maximum possible damage caused by such attacks can be reduced. In 
(Furdek et al., 2010c), a similar approach was developed for minimizing crosstalk effects 
caused by in-band jamming through judicious wavelength assignment. Our current ongoing 
work in attack-aware optical network planning is focused on survivability mechanisms and 
node power equalization placement.  
3.2 Attack detection 
Detection of an attack relies closely on reliable and accurate monitoring methods. In 
TONs, real-time monitoring must take place in the optical domain, without electronically 
interpreting the carried data. Descriptions of techniques for monitoring various optical 
signal parameters can be found in (Ho & Chen, 2009; Kilper et al., 2004). Depending on 
the technology, monitoring methods should be capable of measuring parameters such as 
channel power (peak and average) and aggregate WDM signal power, eye diagram, 
optical spectrum, polarization state, phase, pulse shape, Q-factor, chromatic and 
polarization-mode dispersion (PMD) etc. The measured parameters indicate the level of 
quality of aggregate WDM layer parameters, as well as individual signal quality 
parameters. Due to high prices of monitoring equipment, placing their minimal number in 
strategic locations and establishing supervisory channels able to detect as many faults as 
possible remains an important network planning problem. Today, there are commercially 
available reconfigurable optical switches which provide per-channel power and 
wavelength monitoring, such as that from (Cisco, 2011). Furthermore, they are usually 
equipped with variable optical attenuators and are, thus, able to dynamically react to 
excessive power levels on individual channels and thwart jamming attacks. However, 
these devices are not yet widely deployed. Currently, around 80% of deployed network 
nodes consist of fixed optical switches and add-drop multiplexers (FOADMs) whose 
power settings are determined in the system commissioning phase and do not offer the 
capability of dynamically managing power level fluctuations of incoming signals. Current 
market trends show a tendency of reconfigurable node usage increasing to 50% of 
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network nodes in the next few years, while the remaining nodes will still consist of 
FOADMs (Zsigmond, 2011).  
Some monitoring methods which can detect specific attack scenarios are elaborated in 
(Médard et al., 1997). These methods can rely on statistical analysis of the optical properties 
of transmitted signals or they can use special, dedicated signals. Statistical methods include 
wideband power detection and optical spectrum analysis. The first method measures the 
power over a wide bandwidth and reacts to deviations from statistically computed expected 
power levels. It may be able to detect a high-powered in-band jamming attack, but sporadic 
jamming attacks, jamming attacks which deteriorate the SNR without changing the power 
levels in the affected signals or tapping attacks which tap a very small amount of the total 
signal power may not be detectable by this method. The second method, i.e. optical 
spectrum analysis, measures the shape of optical signal spectrum. It is able to detect an out-
of-band jamming attack causing gain competition, but in-band jamming may go undetected 
if the attacking signal doesn’t introduce significant spectrum changes. This method isn’t 
very helpful at detecting tapping attacks, unless the analyzer is placed on the link which 
drains the tapped portion of the signal and under the condition that it is able to distinguish 
authorized from unauthorized communication.  
Two of the most common monitoring methods which use dedicated signals are the pilot 
tone method and optical time domain reflectometry (OTDR). Pilot tones are special signals 
dedicated to detecting transmission interruption. They may be carried along the legitimate 
signal’s path at a different frequency. Their application in detecting in-band jamming 
requires very complex scenarios, because a pilot tone can only detect jamming on the very 
same frequency. Furthermore, pilot tones may be jammed themselves, creating an 
opportunity to mask jamming on legitimate lightpaths. Gain competition attacks may be 
discovered by pilot tones, but only if they receive amplification from the same EDFA as 
affected lightpaths. Even in this case, the BER degradation of the pilot tone caused by gain 
competition may go undetected because their main purpose is only to assert availability of 
communication, and not the available QoS. Pilot tones provide little help in detection of 
tapping, which would require a significant degradation of the signal quality. The main 
principle of OTDR is to inject pilot tones onto a link and analyze its echo in order to 
determine fiber cuts or losses, which makes attack detection abilities of these two methods 
similar. Detection of in-band jamming differs from the pilot-tone method only in its 
occurrence at the front-end of the link. Due to the fact that EDFAs are unidirectional, the 
OTDR method will not be able to detect gain competition. On the other hand, it may be 
successful in detecting tapping, which causes discontinuities in the reflected pilot tone.  
3.3 Reaction to attacks 
Once the presence of an attack is detected in the network, the NMS will try to eliminate it 
as soon as possible and re-establish reliable communication. Reaction from an attack at 
the optical layer should be fast and recovery should take place before the upper, slower 
network layers activate their reaction mechanisms. In most cases, the link on which the 
presence of an attack was detected will be switched off, which will trigger mechanisms for 
network survivability. Survivability mechanisms include protection, where resources are 
reserved for pre-computed backup paths of each of the working paths at lightpath setup 
time, and restoration, in which backup paths are computed upon a failure of the working 
www.intechopen.com
 Optical Communications Systems 
 
142 
path. Protection can be dedicated, where each backup path has its own dedicated 
resources, or shared, where resource sharing among backup paths of link-disjoint 
working paths is allowed. After finding a backup path for the affected connections, 
transmission will resume. Finding the exact location of the attack and disabling the 
attacker before re-establishing transmission of affected connections is crucial for this step. 
If these conditions are not met, protection resources may be wasted and switching the 
transmission to backup paths may even enhance attack propagation and worsen its 
effects.  
A standardized approach for attack management has not yet been established. The main 
reason for this is the fact that optical monitoring technology hasn’t yet reached its maturity 
and cannot provide reliable attack detection (Rejeb et al., 2006b), as well as the fact that the 
fault and localization methods design highly depends on the specific physical layer details 
(Rejeb et al., 2006a). Several frameworks for managing physical-layer attacks have been 
proposed in the literature. Reliable attack detection in some of them is based on the 
currently unrealistic assumption that all nodes are able to provide per channel monitoring, 
while others propose efficient monitoring placement policies, matching more realistic 
network scenarios. 
Initial works on attack source identification date from the late 90’s. In (Bergman et al., 1998), 
the authors propose a distributed algorithm for localizing jamming attacks based on the 
relation between the signal power metrics at the output and input of each node. 
Neighboring nodes exchange messages and determine the presence of an attack. The nodes 
are aware of their positions along every connection (i.e., whether they are upstream or 
downstream from the neighboring node they exchange messages with) so the algorithm is 
able to find the most upstream node which detects an attack along a connection, and thus 
can identify the source of the attack.  
In the next decade, (Wu & Somani, 2005) provide a model of jamming attacks exploiting 
intrachannel crosstalk in optical switches with propagation capabilities, which enable 
affected lightpaths to acquire attacking capabilities and spread the attack to lightpaths 
which do not share any common physical components with the original attacker. They 
identify the assumption of all nodes being able to monitor all channels as unrealistic due to 
the high costs of this solution and propose a monitoring node model, their sparse 
placement, an additional test connection setup policy and a lightpath routing policy which 
is able to localize the source of a single crosstalk attack in the network.  
In (Mas et al., 2005), the problem of finding the exact location of the failure is extended to 
the presence of single and multiple failures in cases where alarms can be false and/or lost.  
This problem is NP-complete even when no false or lost alarms exist. The algorithm is based 
on building a binary tree whose branches correspond to sets of network elements which will 
raise an alarm when a particular network component fails. Alarms differ according to the 
type of the failure and equipment used. When alarms are raised during network operation, 
the location of the failure is determined by traversing the binary tree and finding the 
components whose corresponding failures justify the received alarms. The authors also 
propose an optimal monitoring placement scheme for minimizing the number of network 
elements which are candidates to have a failure and, thus, minimizing the result given by 
the failure location algorithm.  
www.intechopen.com
 Physical-Layer Attacks in Transparent Optical Networks 
 
143 
(Rejeb et al., 2006a) investigate the local correlation of security failures and attacks at each 
OXC node and mechanisms to discover the tracks of multiple attacks through the network 
using as little monitoring information as possible. The correct functioning of this distributed 
algorithm relies on a reliable NMS which provides correct message passing and processing 
at local nodes. Namely, the algorithm uses updated connection and monitoring information 
at the input and output sides of any OXC node in the network. In order to decrease these 
tight requirements on monitoring information, the health of lightpaths which 
simultaneously propagate through OXC nodes is estimated through correlation with other 
lightpaths. When a node detects serious performance degradation along a lightpath at its 
output side, it runs a generic procedure for localizing the set of lightpaths which traverse 
this node and are most likely to be the offender. The localization procedure is then 
delegated to the next upstream node along each of these lightpaths which also registers 
performance degradation, and this is repeated until no such node is found.  
In (Stanic & Subramaniam, 2011), the authors propose a fault localization scheme which 
collects monitoring information from lightpaths which carry traffic and from additionally 
established supervisory lightpath, achieving complete fault localization coverage. The 
authors consider a monitoring model where each OXC node is capable of detecting in-band 
loss–of-light faults. The problem of deciding which supervisory lightpaths will be added to 
the given set of traffic lightpaths is formulated as an Integer Linear Program (ILP) and an 
efficient heuristic approach for computing the optimal set of supervisory lightpaths is 
proposed. 
4. Conclusion 
This chapter presents an overview of the vulnerabilities of Transparent Optical Networks 
(TONs) to various physical-layer attacks. Furthermore, methods for attack detection and 
localization, as well as various countermeasures against attacks are described. As a result of 
the vulnerabilities associated with TONs stemming from optical components, transparency 
and high speed, new approaches to network security are increasingly needed as networks 
migrate to all-optical transmission.  Such security frameworks require new, tailored attack 
detection, localization and network restoration mechanisms. In addition to upgrading 
existing ways of dealing with network failures and attacks, significant attention should be 
paid to prevention mechanisms, attack-aware planning and improved optical monitoring 
methods. 
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